At a time when most major North American cities are in process of either laying the groundwork for, or constructing, comprehensive rapid transit networks, Winnipeg presents itself as a distinct hold-out against the trend. Currently it is not even actively pondering such future option. Its course of action stands in stark contrast against that taken by Edmonton and Calgary — cities quite similar in population, geographic context, and physical layout but which undertook to plan (and subsequently install) rapid transit during a stage of their development when they possessed both populations and ridership levels drastically lower than that of their Manitoba equivalent. Winnipeg, furthermore, now finds itself not only the largest major Canadian city not committed to a rapid transit solution of its commuter (and commuter-related) needs but is also presently the only remaining large-scale public transit system in Canada which relies on a vehicle fleet composed entirely of diesel buses operating totally on streets shared with automobile traffic.
Why, then, the disparate treatment of a problem held in common with similar urban areas? Perhaps a recounting of the public debate over, and political fate suffered by, rapid transit proposals which have surfaced in past in Winnipeg will turn up some cogent answers to the latter question. In the exploration which follows, attention will be confined (both for the sake of realism and brevity) to those episodes where sober background studies were carried out accompanied by significant public discussion.
It is ironic (although, perhaps, entirely fitting) that the first concrete and technically-versed rapid transit proposal to arise in Winnipeg came about in response to a competing expressway bid. Like all of its successors, it was carried out neither as a matter of independent inquiry into the appropriateness of rapid transit to the Winnipeg setting, nor as an attempted embodiment of rampant public sentiment in favour of rapid transit. Rather, it was aimed at salvaging a meaningful role for public transit in face of strenuous attempts by expressway enthusiasts to cut back transit service to the bare minimum standards necessary to accommodate only the most hard-pressed passengers and avert total traffic strangulation.
In line with the drift of "progressive" thought which was extant during the early post-war period, in 1955 the Metropolitan Planning Commission (acting chiefly at the behest of the Downtown Business Association) retained the much sought-after traffic engineering firm, Wilbur Smith & Associates (of New Haven, Connecticut), to carry out a lengthy and thoroughgoing survey of the future travel demands and needs expected to have been absorbed by the Winnipeg area roadway and transit network. In explaining why it had been called upon to supply its expertise on this topic, Smith & Co. painted a picture of impending crisis (as consultants are wont to do).
Since 1946, population in the Metropolitan Area has increased by 28 per cent while motor vehicle registrations have increased nearly three times from 29,000 to almost 85,000 vehicles. This total of vehicles is supplemented daily by vehicles from throughout Manitoba and Western Canada which visit the Winnipeg area for business and other purposes.
Important improvements have been made in the street system, but they lagged behind needs and in most cases offered only token relief. Parking space in the central business district, the focal point of local activity, has become scarce and the public transport system found itself caught in a vicious circle of decreasing patronage, increasing operator costs, reduced service and increasing fares. 1
As well, their pronouncements for transit were particularly dire.
During 1946, an all-time high of over 105 million passengers were carried on public transit vehicles. Since then total passengers have diminished at a gradual but steady rate. In 1956 nearly 71 million persons were carried by the Greater Winnipeg transit system. While passengers and revenues have declined, operating costs and fares have increased. these circumstances tend to divert larger volumes of passengers each year to other means of transportation and principally to the use of private vehicles.2
Thus justifying its larger reasoning, the Smith Report (released in 1957) then projects the continuation of trends severely detrimental to the viability of transit some 25 years into the future; no possibility of a "levelling off" effect is entertained.
Continuation of (the) current downward trend in annual riders will result in a reduction to approximately 43,000,000 riders in 1970. At the same time it is estimated that operating costs and fares will continue upward although the extent of the trend is difficult to forecast ... After full consideration of all the available data it is believed that transit riding will continue to decrease in Greater Winnipeg and that by 1981 annual revenue rides might reach a level as low as approximately 40,000,000 per year. (Editor's Note: Making use of the considerable benefit of hindsight, actual revenue passenger levels recorded for the years 1970 and 1981 were 58,675,000 and 60,416,000 respectively.3
It concluded by prescribing the construction of an extensive, area-wide network of radial and circumferential expressways — including a "central loop" tightly encircling the downtown core. Transit vehicles were not accorded any place in this scheme for the paradoxical reason that making use of expressways would deny passengers "convenient access" to them. It was further ironically suggested that the most meaningful measure which could be taken to insure the future health of the transit system would be the elimination of all but "self-financing" (i.e. money-making) routes (the latter variety being chiefly in the inner city).
Much to his credit, the pugnacious and dedicated then chairman of the Greater Winnipeg Transit Commission — Jack Blumberg — refused to "roll over and play dead". Launching its own counter-offensive to the perceived assault on the Wilbur Smith Report, the Transit Commission (at Blumberg's urging) hired its own, equally high-powered "expert-on-call" — Norman D. Wilson ("consulting engineer in urban transportation and city planning") of Toronto — who had been actively involved in the design and construction of Toronto's Yonge Street subway (opened 1954). Blumberg proclaimed, "U.S. public transport has become a passing thing, but we have no intention to allow that to happen here." 4
Mr. Blumberg caustically derided the logic behind the Smith analysis and recommendations. Transit's ills, he maintained, were not entirely of its own devising; rather, it was being victimized, in considerable measure, by a sort of "automative psychosis". Further he argued:
...the transit system cannot be improved any more. Its equipment is at the maximum of development now ... clogged city streets prevented any better service being introduced. the down trend can be slowed, he said, if the city gets some other type of transportation than our present bus service. A subway! 5
Wilson's report recommends a subway system for Winnipeg, but it also contained some telling and adroitly-phrased salvoes against the expressway juggernaut:
The construction of specialized roadways for motor vehicles, completely grade-separated from the existing street system, offers but a limited solution for the reason that an expressway has no terminal facilities other than the existing public streets. all motor vehicle traffic destined for the downtown area (much the greater part of that moving) will still have to debouch into the downtown streets and seek to obtain parking accommodation in the business district. The dead storage of motor vehicles within the downtown area adds nothing to the attractiveness of its appearance, and detracts from its overall business utility. An expressway will indeed tend to induce the use of more motor vehicles so that the terminal facilities will be in increased demand. Unless the downtown streets can readily handle the traffic leaving an expressway, traffic will back up on it and clog all movement, including that solely interested in cross-town travel. No benefit will accrue to the transit system, which must also serve the area.6
It is curious that Wilson bases his call for the prompt installation of a conventional, high-capacity subway on the same projection of population for 1981 (765,000) that caused the Smith concern to reject such an eventuality as unwarranted. (This is indicative of a technical debate which has yet to be resolved — possibly because it has no "hard and fast" answer for all given situations. Numerous European cities installed "heavy-rail" transit systems — which are now quite successful in terms of patronization — when their populations had barely attained 500,000.) While his polemics building a case for subway are quite airtight, the technical basis for the derivation of the configuration of his proposed system for Winnipeg (see Map 1) is rather mystifying. Consisting of three crisscrossing rapid transit lines, the routes appear to have been laid out by superimposing three roughly equidistantly-spaced semicircles on a map of the city. It owes more to a belief in geometric "neatness" than it does to any clearcut adherence to Winnipeg's actual dominant patterns of travel demand and traffic circulation.
Press reaction to the specifics of Wilson's subway proposal was — with a handful of minor reservations — enthusiastic. The mere notion that Winnipeg might consider such a mammoth and sophisticated undertaking seemed — in the eye of the Free Press editorialists — to catapault it into the "big leagues" of cities:
The report, deserves serious study and support by every Greater Winnipeg municipality. Subway construction in Toronto has resulted in a 37 per cent increase in the assessment of land in the vicinity of the subway, compared with an over-all city increase of 20 per cent. The additional tax revenue from this higher assessment is reckoned to be more than enough to meet the annual charges required to carry the debenture debt of the subway.
The alternative is ... to provide equally costly roads, such as those projected in the Wilbur Smith traffic report; and yet these new roads will not, in the long run, give the metro area any lasting benefit.
... it is some comfort to realize that the solution to our future traffic problems does not depend entirely on a gridwork of expressways towering above our city streets. 7
The response of public officials — possibly astounded by the audaciousness of the proposition — was guarded and confused. There having been no precedent for a major, capital-intensive transit funding request, they were not quite certain how to deal with it. Having to answer to the electorate for bankrolling it, they evidenced a natural wariness to jump aboard the subway "bandwagon":
The idea of subway trains roaring under the heart of downtown Winnipeg has caught municipal and provincial officials unawares.
They don't know who would pay for a subway costing roughly $265 million to build.
But they bank heavily on provincial and possibly federal aid. They say a subway would serve much the same purpose as a surface expressway.8
But apart from sparking an initial flush of media attention to the notion of Winnipeg having some form of rapid transit, little tangible progress toward the goal of a subway could be cited. Sporadic efforts were made in the ensuing years through 1966 to keep the subway topic in the public imagination. Chief torch-bearer for these efforts was then general manager of the Greater Winnipeg Transit Commission (who later stepped into the newly-created post of Metro transit director), D. I. MacDonald.
Seizing upon the expressway-debunking rhetoric of the Wilson Report, MacDonald tirelessly campaigned to see its vision translated into physical fact. Hoping to lend an appearance of movement toward that goal, he in 1961 dispatched one of his prized lieutenants — pro-transit Metro councillor Albert Bennett — on a well-hyped "fact-finding mission" to Stockholm, Sweden.
An article in the Free Press tipped the mission's purported rationale: "Stockholm built a first subway — in a climate simliar to Winnipeg's — when its population was about 600,000 " not far from Greater Winnipeg's 450,000" MacDonald and his adherents confidently predicted a start to construction of the first subway segment by 1963 — with the essentials of the network slated to be in place, and open for service, by 1970.
But the determined coterie of subway boosters had banked heavily on a tactical assumption that the coming of area-wide, metropolitan government to the City of Winnipeg and neighbouring suburban municipalities would pave the way for swift ratepayer endorsement of a subway bond issue (or some similar capitalization deal). The striking of any such arrangement would, however, have necessarily entailed major infusion of subsidies from higher levels of government. When such failed to develop, MacDonald and cohorts tempered their expectations accordingly — pushing the hypothetical date of subway activation further and further back into some hazy future when (financial and ridership) "conditions would be ripe".
The initial burst of subway speculation having died out by 1962, MacDonald turned for solace to the seemingly more attainable and low key alternative of elevated, "fixed guideway" systems. In that year, he announced his intention to travel to Seattle to inspect the workings of the city's newly-installed (as the tourist-oriented showpiece of a World's Fair then in progress) monorail — with an eye toward assessing its suitability to the Winnipeg context. Although MacDonald apparently went — and returned — somewhat of a skeptic about the value of monorail for other than casual use 10, his visit proved a fateful one, monorail was later to be resurrected to figure prominently in Winnipeg's ongoing rapid transit debate.
But while Metro's transit director was, after 5 years of fruitless lobbying, souring on the salability of a subway (either as a consequence of the public and politicians' less-than-enthusiastic response — or the virtually complete lack of a sense of urgency inspired by his labours), a new, outspoken and powerful subway champion was emerging: Metro Councillor Bernie Wolfe — head of Metro's streets and transit committee (and later to become Metro vice-chairman, and Western Regional director of the Canadian Transport Commission). In 1964, Wolfe unilaterally summoned his (not inconsiderable) influence to try to re-inject the Wilson subway scheme into the public arena. Repeating many of the old arguments, he received little encouragement, however, for hist by now wearied ex-ally, Mr. MacDonald (who, in press interviews on the subject, even actively undercut the former position he had staked out intently for so many years):
... Mr. MacDonald said in the recommendations of the Norman Wilson report will be considered again when the massive (W.A.T.S.) study is completed, possibly in 1966. He said there are no cities with a subway system that have a population of less than 1,000,000 — and maybe cities with a population of more than 1,000,000 still have no subway system. 11
For all intents and purposes, 1964 spelled the act of dismissal to permanent irrelevance for the Wilson Report
A political Tribune editorial pronounced a symbolic obituary for it:
... Metro, whether through policy or just lack of funds, has not followed the Wilbur Smith way; but neither has it followed Mr. Wilson. In fact, there is no clear-cut streets and transit policy. Tentative moves in that direction have been made but no long range plans have been prepared for distinctive Winnipeg conditions — geographic, demographic, and climatic.
With all respect to Mr. Norman Wilson, his report had the weakness that not enough consideration was given to alternative means of providing rapid transit ... He did not exhaustively consider the existing railway rights of way in terms of (sic) its application to rapid transit service into the downtown area. 12
By the mid-1960s, there was a sense among Winnipeg's political and administrative establishment (enunciated very succinctly by the Tribune editorial reproduced above) that a co-ordinated and balanced approach to urban transport planning (entailing the artful integration of highway and transit objectives) was needed. In catering to this sentiment, an omnibus, area-wide transport study — carried out by Metro's streets and traffic department — was mounted. Prepatory to the striking of a 25-year master plan for the upgrading of Winnipeg's metropolitan transportation capital works, an exhaustive survey (aiming for 100% participation) was carried out of the Winnipeg public's travel habits and preferences.
While awaiting the outcome of said exercise, D. I. MacDonald continued to review more "pragmatic" alternatives to a full-fledged subway. In 1966, he again ushered off two Metro councillors (Coulter and Huband) — who were regarded as sympathetic to transit — this time, to Pittsburgh to investigate the latter's "rapid transit expressway" experiment (which was essentially a computer-operated, rubber-tired bus running in a channelized, concrete "track"). Evident in his "send off" remarks to the press was an unspoken hope that his promotional problems would be answered by the perfection of an "intermediate capacity rapid transit" prototype — geared to accommodating middle-range passenger volumes on a much less costly and grandiose basis than "heavy" rapid transit:
It has passengers but no driver and hums along on rubber wheels above, below, or on the ground. It is computer-controlled rapid transit — up to 50 miles an hour.
Controlled by computer, it does away with manpower, apart from computer operators. Designed to carry one or a series of 19,000-pound vehicles, the system boasts two-minute service on an economical basis.
"This is the sort of rapid transit that would probably have great appeal to Metro Winnipeg and other centres its size, Mr. MacDonald says. 13
The promised W.A.T.S. report (released in 1968 for public appraisal) — ambitious in conception and costly in execution — conceded only a grudging and perfunctory role to subways (see Map 2). Its authors preferred to make use of the term "medium-capacity transit" to describe it — even though it was contemplated to run completely underground beneath the roadbed of existing major streets. Far from becoming the "backbone" of a re-shaped Winnipeg Transit System, the subway link seemed intended to function as a "shuttle service" between downtown and the prospering public "multiple use area" taking shape around the Polo Park indoor shopping mall:
The public transportation system in the recommended transportation plan for the metropolitan area of Greater Winnipeg ... comprises a high capacity 5.4 mile grade separated rapid transit line extending from Polo Park on Portage Avenue West to the intersection of Hespeler Avenue and Henderson Highway. This rapid transit corridor is complemented by a network of feeder surface bus routes oriented toward the eleven stations along its length, four of which are located in the downtown area. Available or planned parking facilities in the vicinity of the rapid transit terminal stations would provide 'park and ride' facilities for transit riders who wish to use their cars for part of the trip from home to the terminal station. Complementing the rapid transit and feeder bus system are a number of freeway express routes which utilize for of the five proposed internal radial freeways and provide high speed limited stop service from suburban areas to downtown. 14
The fact that the above proposal drew little public comment was reflective of how thoroughly public transit's status was, in this scheme, once again subordinated to that of the privately-owned and -operated automobile. Rather than enjoying a role complementary to the latter, within the scope of the plan it was, once again, relegated to a distinctly stopgap function. Notice of it became submerged under the resultant storm of controversy which swirled for years to follow about the fate of the massive and intrusive freeways system urged as the hallmark of the plan.
The W.A.T.S. planners and engineers did, in passing, carry out desultory testing (by computer simulation modelling) of a subway-rich, transit-oriented solution. Some curious reasoning went into the design of this version (reasoning which has since become the accepted standard in the planning of rapid transit lines). In an attempt to hold down construction and right-of-way acquisition and clearance costs to within "reasonable" limits, the W.A.T.S. subway line routing went a tortuous path about the Winnipeg map — making use of existing railway and hydro transmission corridors to the "fullest extent possible". To satisfy this aim, they deviate some considerable distance from major traffic arteries presently handling the bulk of transit (i.e., bus) trips. To the extent that prospective passengers are deflected in their would-be journey from the most direct available trajectory (in particular, by being compelled to detour by bus to reach remote rapid transit lines), how useful can these routings be expected to be?
Yet, in a glaring inconsistency, the W.A.T.S. authors dismiss the possible use of part of the proposed freeway reservations for rail transit lines because:
... it became obvious that the locations of the freeway alignments did not lend themselves to favourable rapid transit line location, in that existing or anticipated high density residential development and major transit trip attractors were remote from the freeways. As a result, many of the stations could not easily be reached on foot and would require an additional, sometimes lengthy, trip by feeder bus, thus adding trip time and reducing the overall attractiveness of the rapid transit system. 15
To compound this error, they later recommended an extensive operation of express buses over the same freeways found "too remote" to be of any more than nominal usefulness for rail transit!
The "extensive transit" version, the report concludes, is unwarranted by an interpretation of ridership levels it might be expected to induce up until 1991. It is advised, however, that the situation be reassessed at that date to discover whether increased demand then afoot would justify the expansion of the "basic" rapid transit vestige to te proportions envisioned in the "subway-rich" ideal.
The ever-energetic and alert Mr. Wolfe seized upon the W.A.T.S. pretext to begin anew his temporarily sidetracked subway campaign. This time around (1970), he seems to have won the qualified support of Metro's planning director of the time, Earl Levin. Both implied that the realization of a downtown-oriented-subway would serve as a key stimulus to the downtown redevelopment drive then underway:
Metro council will be urged to abandon immediately preparation for a western freeway in favor of a rapid transit system under Portage Avenue.
The request will be made by vice-chairman Bernie Wolfe and planning director Earl Levin who returned on the weekend from a trip to Montreal and Toronto where they promoted Metro's Downtown Development Plan.
Both he and Mr. Levin shied away from the suggestion but left the impression that large Canadian financial interests are reluctant to invest in the huge $200 million downtown redevelopment without definite plans for an early rapid transit system. 16
Having been a fitful supporter of subways himself since the inception of subway "scuttlebutt", perennial Mayor Stephen Juba (not, perhaps wishing to be upstaged on a matter of such great civic importance) launched his own unique contribution to the Winnipeg rapid transit fight. At its own instigation, the mayor's office entertained an (allegedly) unsolicited approach by representatives of the Swiss-based Habegger Corporation (manufacturer and installer of monorail equipment and systems) in which they served notice that their firm could, on short notice, supply and install a fully-operational monorail circuit — tailored to Winnipeg's particular needs — along the median strip of Portage Avenue. This was not so much a new idea, then, than a hijacking of the route chosen by W.A.T.S. for its initial subway venture (much to the consternation of Councillor Wolfe). The proposal's unveiling had an air of comic-opera secrecy about it:
(Deputy Mayor) Marion made the announcement at a press conference called after reports of the monorail were aired on a local radio station. Mayor Juba is holidaying out of the city — but within earshot of the radio station.
The firm that would build the transit system is now conducting a feasibility study on installing the monorail in Winnipeg.
City transportation officials have not been consulted, nor have any of the commissioners nor any provincial officials, Councillor Marion said.
Councillor Marion said the European company hasn't installed rapid transit systems in any other North American cities. He indicated the firm had heard about Winnipeg's transportation problems and came forward with a proposal. 17
Mayor Juba's "coup" was met with a combination of indignation and admiration (although, much to the disservice of the enterprise, the former abounded over the latter by a wide margin). Some saluted the Mayor for his audacity; most opposed him on grounds of operating behind closed doors, being guilty of bald-faced effrontery, and trying to railroad the proposal through Council by the blatant use of political arm-twisting. Columnist Val Werier — long-time ardent transit advocate and well-versed "Juba-watcher" — issued probably the most tempered and impartial reaction to the revelation of Juba's monorail package:
(T)his is the picture: pillars of concrete rising on a main thoroughfare in Winnipeg. The prospect doesn't sound attractive and negates some of the advances made in the downtown area. There are trees on the centre strips of Portage and along Main because citizens demanded them as a relief to the concrete. Today there is a yearning for more human touches in the city. This won't be accomplished by a forest of concrete pillars, no matter how pleasing their design.
...(Yet) whatever is suggested will have to be considered for the particular needs of Winnipeg's transit system. No one has all the answers to transit problems and Mayor Juba may perform a public service by forcing attention to the transit question by injecting the revolutionary concept of the monorail. It shoud start some hard discussion on what Winnipeg should do about the downtown area. 18
Juba's initiative caused a competing monorail bid to surface as well: that of E.M.S. Electronik — Canadian subsiduary of Alweg, the Japanese — Austrian — Swiss consortium that had built the Seattle monorail. In its presentation to civic environment committee, Alweg stressed a number of commendable "selling points": speediness of installation and operationalization; the system's flexibility to be altered and extended; its ready adaptability to handle varying volumes of ridership; and its greatly lower capital costs (usage of it for the "enhanced" W.A.T.S. rapid transit would — by supplier's estimate — enable the latter to be "brought in" for only slightly greater total expense than that incurred in installing the "minimal" subway segment). 19 Additionally, the company's North American production line would have been established in Winnipeg to produce the vehicles required here. If Winnipeg's monorail performed up to expectation, it would serve as a "demonstration project" for future applications contracts elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere — enabling Winnipeg to reap a potential jobs and sales windfall.
The mayoral motion to give serious consideration to these proposals was set aside before ever reaching the floor of Council for a vote. Probably they owed their short-livedness not to any innate shortcomings — but rather, to a backlash against Juba's patronizingly single-handed and precipitous introduction of them. By 1973, he was forced to wind down (if not actually withdraw) his one-man crusade for monorail.
The ubiquitous Mr. Wolfe appears to have been the catalyst behind the "Southwest Corridor" project — as well as having been the foremost backer of its several predecessors. He had evidently, by this time, narrowed the scope of his lobbying for rapid transit to less elegant expedients than a subway. The proferred availability of a ready-made right-of-way — holding out the promise of lowered public expenditures and a quick start-up on the line's emplacement — seems to have been sufficient bait to lure public officials responsible for the care of transit into almost instantaneously endorsing both a new choice of siting and mode of conveyance (see Map 3):
Winnipeg council authorization for a study on a proposed rapid transit system, using railway rights-of-way from the Portage and Main intersection to the University of Manitoba, will be sought next week by the executive policy committee.
(Chief civic commissioner) MacDonald said such a system would be the first of its kind in (sic) America, and reducing travelling time from downtown Winnipeg to Fort Garry would be an inducement for more transit riders. 20
This turn of events was greeted with great jubilation at the editorial suite of the Tribune. It represented the adoption as public policy of a position they had taken since 1961: that the use of rail corridors for the operation of rapid transit constituted a tenable compromise solution to Winnipeg's mass transit ills. The editorialists flippantly dismiss the quick turnabout on route priorization as bein all-but inconsequential:
... While it is true that such an idea was contained in the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study for introduction in 1991, the city should not let an opportunity go by to improve (its) transit system, irrespective of previously-assigned priorities. The chance to use the right-of-way may come up long before the date originally assigned to this plan, and to lose the route simply because the city is tied to an inflexible time-table would be a great loss to the city and to the objective of better urban transportation. 21
Following on the heals of this development, unforeseen and jarring upheavals in the economies of the industrialized world (the so-called "energy crisis" of 1972-73) conspired to cast Mayor Juba's outcast monorail proposition in a freshly opportune light. He astutely seized upon this opening to procure consideration of monorail as one possibly appropriate "hardware" option for the "Southwest Corridor" project. Viewing his own brainchild not as being in competetion with other modes — but, rather, meriting separate and more elaborate adjudgment — Juba felt compelled to express his puzzlement at the apparent obsession of "streets and transport division" bureaucrats with gaining the upper hand for some variety of diesel-bus treatment of the Corridor.
Thus began a procedural tango between busway and "rapid-rail" proponents to influence the ultimate modal choice implanted in the Corridor. The engineering firm of DeLeuw-Dillon was in 1975 commissioned by City Council to prepare a study outlining and rating the various combinations of vehicle and plant available for selection. It was promised by the project manager that wide-ranging public input would be sought out to guide the choice decision. 22
During the nearly two years it took for the consultants to return their findings, the Mayor's "pet project" once again dominated the public spotlight. Amidst gathering accusations of high-handedness similar to those flung at him in 1972, Juba successfully courted Council's agreement to foot the bill for Habegger to address Council with an updated rendition of its earlier submission pertaining to the Pembina Highway corridor. While Habegger's claims largely rehashed those lodged in '72, it did present four new wrinkles:
In face of changed circumstances and Council's outwardly warmer reception of the more recent "sales pitch", Juba had ample reason to exalt over the widely-held impression that the elusive showpiece on which he had aggressively staked the reputation of his long career in civic office seemed well within his grasp. 24 The release of the DeLeuw-Dillon Report, however, rudely jerked him and his inner circle back to earth; monorail (and all other "fixed-rail" technologies) were to be summarily banished from appearing on the "transitway" until after the "magic" year, 1991. In the consultants' words:
In May 1975 the City of Winnipeg, in co-operation with the Province of Manitoba and the Federal Government, initiated the Southwest Transit Corridor Study. The objective of the study was to examine the feasibility of implementing a new rapid transit system on its own right-of-way in the South-west corridor of the city, generally between the downtown area and the University of Manitoba, as a demonstration project.
... At least until 1991, both diesel and trolley operation have been shown to be supperior to light rail or fixed guideway systems in the corridor. Thus, within this time frame there appear to be no benefits in introducing either of these technologies in the corridor.
Beyond 1991, however, changes may occur in land use and population distribution in the City which may affect travel demand in the corridor. These may be significant enough to warrant re-examination of higher capacity transit systems. 25
There are two questions begged by the drift of this analysis. Why should conditions in 1991 — seven years hence — be so drastically altered as to suddenly dictate a move to "light-rail" technologies? Secondly, why not avoid the additional expense and inconvenience which will be entailed in upgrading the Corridor for use by "intermediate capacity" systems by simply installing them at the outset? The consultants' strategy seems a tactic guaranteed to "shoehorn" in bus-dependent operation long into the foreseeable future.
After a period of being shuffled in and out of the City's "five-year capital development program", the "Southwest Transit Corridor" proposal appears to have settled into a near-permanent limbo. At the time of this writing (1984), the project last received active consideration by Council for funding support in 1978 — at which time it was put on indefinite "hold":
Mayor Robert Steen said Tuesday the city isn't financially able to proceed with the plan at this time because there is no sign of senior government participation in the idea. 26
Having by now spent six years on the "back burner", the Southwest Transit Corridor appears yet another rapid transit opening fallen victim to inertia and mealy-mouthed expresions of "support in principle".
Like monorail, this does not really represent a distinct proposal; rather, it encompasses the generalizing of the "busway-in-rail corridor" concept promoted in the Southwest Transit Corridor Study through its extension to similar opportunities elsewhere in Metro (see Map 3). Three others have been identified and enshrined as "official policy" in Plan Winnipeg — the City's master development document intended to guide Winnipeg into the 21st Century. The objectives stated have an air of calculated prudence about them: terms such as "incremental extensions to the transit system" and "non capital-intensive transportation options" abound. In all candor — insofar as its transit content is concerned — it is a "blueprint for inaction".
A post-script to Plan Winnipeg is the recent signing of a thrust of the agreement, if exploited, would appear to preclude consideration of non-bus methods of passenger transport.
preliminary Canada/Manitoba Memorandum of Understanding on Transportation and Urban Bus Industrial Development (Dated December 8, 1983) 27. Although ostensibly a technology- and job-related initiative, language is contained in its terms of reference sufficiently open-ended to permit the provision of both busway construction and operating subsidies falling under the "regional industrial expansion" rubric:
(It is desired) to establish Winnipeg as a centre of expertise for the technological development and manufacturing of advanced urban buses and other related industrial products.
A plan is to be developed by a Task Force drawing together appropriate officials of the federal and provincial governments in co-operation with key industry representatives and would delineate the parameters of the project and associated costs. The plan would focus on three main areas: R&D, prototype development and demonstration. If deemed feasible the demonstration phase could occur along a dedicated roadway in the city's Southwest Corridor. 28
Strong hints were dropped at (and since) the press conference unveiling the agreement that the above clause would be exploited to the fullest. Whatever faint hope this expedient holds out for the realization of the long-delayed Corridor (partially if innovative flywheel or electric storage-battery techniques can be adapted for use within its confines), the
1984 marks the 25th anniversary of the launching of the first formal rapid transit proposal for Winnipeg. Yet today rapid transit appears to be less a political priority than it was two decades ago when the city was smaller and the need not as pressing. Considering the length, tenacity and variety of local efforts at securing local transit, why is Winnipeg so singularly bereft of any tangible evidence of success? Having surveyed the historical literature, we are now in the position to suppply four cogent answers.
First, the external factors. Both senior governments impede the development of rapid transit largely because they're fearful of costs. Federaly there is no national policy to formally subsidize rapid transit leaving aid dependent on the "string pulling" of federal politicians hailing from the supplicant city. Further, federal housing policy encourages low density housing which extends urban sprawl and is therefore contrary to efficient public transit. Similarly, federal and provincial governments favour highway expansion in urban areas again discouraging a balanced transportation system.
In contrast to provincial governments in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia where traditional and LRT transit systems are heavily subsidized, the Province of Manitoba consistently has discouraged whatever approaches Winnipeg Transit officials have made to the Province to underwrite system upgrading. The Provincial officials tend to think more in terms of dial-a-bus or special bus lanes rather than more intensive and sophisticated technologies. The Province did however back into support of the Southwest Transit Corridor (a Lloyd Axworthy ploy to tap into D.R.E.E. funds and aid the provincially owned Flyer Bus Company) without considering the technical merits of such an intervention. But this plan is now in abeyance.
Second, the preponderance of the "lone horseman" carrying the ball. From day one, these have been, by and large, career "transit spokesmen". They have, it must be said, not made a very keen job of enlisting the voting and taxpaying public behind their efforts (although neither have highway proponents troubled much to "go public", either). Often through sheer tactical blundering, they have "lost the day" for the rapid transit cause.
Mayor Juba's clumsy stage-management of his cherished monorail must be singled out in this regard. his ham-fisted determination to single-handedly see the project through not only played into the hands of his opponents, but alienated many who likely would have supported it on its merits. Instead, they felt compelled to register their disapproval of the secretive and impudent manner in which he had attempted to get it "rubber-stamped" by Council.
The "lone-horseman" syndrome is a symptom of Winnipeg politics. It must be stressed that the public's silence on transit matters is reflective not of their indifferences to its betterment, but rather their resentment at not being solicited for comment on ther own preferences or apprised of behind-the-scenes developments at City Hall. As well there is an imbred skepticism stemming from the unrelenting rejection suffered by past transit improvement campaigns.
Third, transit taking the "back seat" to the automobile. As previously detailed, all of the transit proposals contained herein were either issued in response to highway-oriented schemes openly denigrating the importance of public transit's contribution to the operation of a balanced and well-functioning urban transport network, or were designed to "pick up the leftovers" from plans highlighting the laying out of convoluted and all-encompassing expressway mazes. Symbolic of this one-sideness was the removal, in Winnipeg, of the term "transit" from the bureaucracy (now entitled "streets and traffic division") encharged with the planning, emplacement, and maintenance of urban transport facilities. Accompanying this was the scrappiig for thte former Metro Council's "sub-committee on transit" in favour of Unicity's assignment of one member of its "works and operations" committee to deal (on a part time basis) with transit matters. Furthermore, Winnipeg Transit presently relies almost entirely upon "streets and traffic" division to supply it with development research and travel-survey data.
Fourth, and last, entrenched fiscal conservatism. Since the 1919 General Strike, city council in Winnipeg has followed business domination as its prime credo. This takes various forms. For example, incumbent Mayor Bill Norrie the reigning virtuoso of the "calculated stall". On all-too-numerous occasions he has single-handedly sabotaged moves towards rapid transit by ceaselessly and ploddingly invoking his pet shibboleths: "Let's keep our options open" and "An expenditure of such magnitude and impact requires careful consideration on our part".
As well, city council's most forceful and consistent role is to support developers. This means facilitating suburban expansion and shopping centre development which in turn favours major thoroughfare construction. The pro-developer majority also never tires of calling for yearly fare hikes and the curtailment of service as the "cure" for Winnipeg Transit's ills. This has become such a ritual that the NDP provincial government (until 1983) felt compelled to resort to conditional grants subject to no transit fare increase. On at least one occasion there has been a threat to sell off the public transit system to the highest bidder.
Of course, fiscal conservatism looms most iminously in budgets. In this regard, the transit system has been particullrly victimized by the presumptive fiscal watchdogs' imitation of "benign neglect". When the supposed defense of budgetary integrity is invoked with the wearisome regularity observed in Winnipeg, it unmasks a numbing (and ultimately self-defeating) propensity to tout inaction as a positive virtue. Not only does this attitude foster a climate of indolence and neglect; it also carries with it a severe opportunity cost. Where money might once have been set aside for rapid transit if prompt action had been taken, procrastination has seen such opportunities endlessly frittered away (as inflating construction and financing charges placed them further and further beyond the means of local authorities to afford). As well, the existing, surface transit system falls farther and farther behind in its ability to "deliver the goods" as fare increases and service cutbacks exact their toll on ridership and revenue. Put in the budget-tighteners' own framework of accountancy, transit has been rendered a steadily depreciating asset both in terms of its physical and operational state of repair, its capital requirements, and the "staying power" of the political wills to better its stature.
Beyond fiscal conservatism, Mayor Bill Norrie, along with the right wing caucus headed by Councillor Jim Ernst, stands as the leader against rapid transit. A typical example from a 1977 motion to advance funding for the Southwest Transit Corridor in which Norrie said, "We really have to set our priorities. The aqueduct and sewer system have a much higher priority than monorail and even the (transit) Corridor". 29 And at the same time Norrie supported the purchase of the Tuxedo Golf Course. Again on Norrie's position on rapid transit, Steve Juba summarized his performance: "Juba accused Norrie of beating around the bush and using stalling tactics and complaining the proposal has been repeatedly shelved since he first suggested it in the late 1960s". 30 One must also note Norrie's obsession with diesel buses which again reflects behaviour more like an adherent of the highway lobby encouraging urban sprawl.
And so, gazing about the Winnipeg scene in 1984, rapid transit stands less viable in the political and public eye than it was in the previous two decades even though the need and conditions for it are more compelling. One readily discerns that rapid transit has been banished into obscurity by political leaders who themselves deserve banishment. For the future one may expect a new animator to come forward — another one-man-band — with a new proposal that will suffer the same fate as the previous proposals. Only when a formal program for rapid transit becomes linked with public consciousness and understanding, replacing power broker politics, will there be a chance of breaking this sorry pattern.